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Abstract: In this paper we consider the implications of the two diﬀerent exchange-rate
systems in Hong Kong (HK) and Singapore (SP) on the economic performance of these
two economies. While HK has a pegged exchange-rate regime under a currency board
system (CBS), SP has a managed-float system with monitoring band. We examine
whether the managed-float system of SP provides an advantage over the rigid CBS of
HK in mitigating the recession caused by the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), and the
implications of the diﬀerences in the exchange-rate systems on interest-rate behaviour.
Our empirical results show that the monitoring band system in SP has not only allowed
a greater flexibility in the choice of the exchange rate, but also a greater autonomy in
the choice of interest rate to mitigate the crisis, recession or overheating.
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1 Introduction
Hong Kong (HK) and Singapore (SP) are two Asian economies with many similarities.
Both economies are small and open (in terms of trade and capital flows), with relatively
well developed financial sectors. They have, however, rather diﬀerent monetary systems
and exchange regimes. HK has a currency board system (CBS) under which the HK
dollar is pegged to the US dollar at a fixed exchange rate. On the other hand, SP has
evolved from a classical sterling-based CBS into a managed-float system under which
the value of the SP dollar is managed against an undisclosed trade-weighted basket of
foreign currencies. In this paper we consider the implications of the two exchange-rate
systems on the economic performance of the two economies. In particular, we examine
whether the managed-float system of SP provides an advantage over the rigid CBS
of HK in mitigating the recession caused by the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), and the
implications of the diﬀerences in the exchange-rate systems on interest-rate management.
Among the economies with a CBS, HK is probably the one with the most developed
financial sector and the highest capital mobility1. As pointed out by Kwan and Lui
(1996), the economic health of the HK economy has made HK’s modern CBS an impor-
tant benchmark for international comparisons, evaluations and theoretical developments
of the CBS.2 The recent paper by Tse and Yip (2002) provides a detailed account of the
currency board reforms in HK and their impacts on the interbank market. As pointed
out by Tsang (1999) and Yip (1999), the substantial surge in HK’s interest rate during
the crisis period was the main cause of the subsequent plunge in asset price and reces-
sion, and hence the source of economic pains. Yip and Wang (2002) argued that the
prolonged deflation and the severe recession in HK subsequent to the AFC was due to
1See Tse and Yip (2002) for further details.
2Kwan and Lui (1996) noted that “the economic health and significant strength of Hong Kong
provide an ideal situation to test the vulnerability of a currency board system when it is confronted
with a crisis. ... if Hong Kong’s currency board has to face a crisis when it is subject to shocks
of specified magnitude, then it is hard to imagine that the currency board in a country with poorer
economic health can survive under the same scenario.”
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the inflexibility of HK’s exchange-rate system on one hand and the inflexibility of prices
and wages on another.
While comments on the role of HK’s CBS in helping the economy to counter the
crisis and post-crisis recession are generally unfavourable, SP’s exchange-rate policy
is, however, generally commendable. Lu and Yu (1999) believed that “Singapore’s ...
credible managed floating regime oﬀers a lesson worthy of attention from Hong Kong”
and that “the inherent rigidity of the [currency board] system has ... cost Hong Kong
heavily, by causing procyclical volatility of real interest rates and prices”. Yip and
Wang (2001) and Rajan and Siregar (2002) noted that the SP government allowed the
SP dollar to depreciate by about 20% vis-a`-vis the US dollar during the crisis and
post-crisis periods, which succeeded in oﬀsetting the adverse impact of a permanent re-
alignment of the US dollar vis-a`-vis other Asian currencies. Thus, the relative successful
experience of SP in dealing with the crisis and the post-crisis recession is worth special
attention and consideration by other small open economies, including HK.
As pointed out by Rajan (2002) and Corrado et al. (2002), SP’s exchange-rate
system is an ideal example of the “monitoring band” system favoured by Williamson
(2000). According to Williamson, both the monitoring band and the “crawling band”
are exchange-rate “band[s] around a parity that [are] periodically adjusted in relatively
small steps in a way intended to keep the band[s] in line with the fundamentals.” Com-
pared with the fixed exchange-rate system or Krugman’s (1991) type of target zone, the
adjustable band systems have the advantage of minimizing the possibility of a collapse
or disruptive change in the domestic exchange rate arising from prolonged diﬀerences
between the home and foreign countries’ fundamentals. In addition, as we shall explain
in section 2, the adjustable band systems have the advantage of allowing certain degree
of independence in the domestic interest-rate (monetary) policy even for an economy as
small and open as SP. On the other hand, a monitoring band, as opposed to a crawling
band,
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“does not involve an obligation to defend the edge of the band. The obliga-
tion is instead to avoid intervening within the band (except in a tactical way,
to prevent unwarranted volatility) ... the authorities ... have a whole extra
degree of flexibility ... if they decide the market pressures are overwhelming,
they can choose to allow the rate to take the strain even if this involves the
rate going outside the band.” - Williamson (2000), p.292.
Williamson also elaborated that the monitoring band system is diﬀerent from, and
has obvious advantages over, a floating regime:
“[H]aving a monitoring band may make a diﬀerence even if the authorities
choose not to intervene, so long the market knows that they can employ
policy weapons which they might wield at some future date in seeking to
push the rate back within the band, and they know where the band is. This
knowledge should make the market fearful of pushing the rate so far as to set
up the conditions for a bear squeeze (or a “bull squeeze”). Another possible
reason is that the market may believe that the authorities have chosen a
correct estimate of the long-run equilibrium rate in their positioning of the
band, and this again may discourage the market from pushing the rate as
far as it would otherwise go.”- Williamson (2000), p.292.
After explaining that “if a country intends to pursue a fixed exchange rate policy,
then it ought to do it properly by employing a currency board”, Williamson went on
to suggest that “the debate on exchange rate policy ought not to concern fixed versus
floating rates, but rather currency boards versus crawling (monitoring) bands.” These
comments provide a strong motivation for a study on the exchange-rate systems of HK
and SP, which is important for the debate on the choice of an exchange-rate system.
There are some recent empirical studies on the exchange-rate systems in HK and
SP. Lu and Yu (1999), Yip and Wang (2001) and Yip (2002) showed that the ability
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of SP to use exchange-rate depreciation to absorb and mitigate the impact of the crisis
helped SP tide over the crisis and post-crisis periods with less economic pain. Tse and
Yip (2002) studied the eﬀects of the reforms in the CBS in HK on the interest-rate
diﬀerential between HK and US. They found that the AFC caused a rise in the level
and volatility of the interest-rate diﬀerential during the crisis. They also found that the
introduction of the anti-crisis package and the eventual fading out of the AFC brought
both the level and volatility of the HK-US interest diﬀerential back to the pre-crisis level.
However, there are no similar studies on the SP-US interest diﬀerential, thus forbidding
a comparison of the interest-rate behaviour under the two exchange-rate systems during
the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. In this paper, we shall fill this empirical
gap.
The main objectives of this paper are as follows. First, we investigate whether the
monitoring band system in SP is associated with a greater independence of the interest-
rate policy in SP. If so, this could be an advantage over the rigid CBS, as exemplified
by the choice of lower interest rate as well as lower exchange rate in SP to mitigate the
post-crisis recession (see further discussions in section 2). Second, we examine whether
the monitoring band system in SP, as compared against the CBS in HK, is associated
with a lower volatility of the domestic interest rate relative to the US during the pre-
crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. Third, we investigate whether the diﬀerences in the
exchange-rate systems are associated with a higher domestic-US interest premium in
HK during the crisis. If the empirical findings for the last two questions are positive,
it would imply additional advantages of SP’s monitoring band system over HK’s CBS.
Fourth, we provide improvement over Tse and Yip’s (2002) empirical analysis. In this
paper, we allow for a diﬀerence in the interest-rate response between the crisis and the
non-crisis periods, thus enabling us to investigate whether there is any panic response
in the two interbank markets during the crisis period. As we shall see, allowing for a
diﬀerence in the interest-rate response results in higher estimates of the HK-US interest
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diﬀerential during the AFC.
The arrangement of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we discuss the exchange-rate
systems in the two economies, with special emphasis on their implications for interest-
rate movements and policies. We point out that the SP government has a very powerful
set-up to influence the equilibrium exchange rate. The powerful set-up is the underlying
reason for the credibility of SP’s exchange-rate system. Subsequently, we outline the
hypotheses to be tested. The data and the econometric methodology are described in
section 3. We report the empirical results in section 4. Finally, section 5 provides the
conclusion.
2 The Exchange-Rate Systems in HK and SP: Some
Testable Hypotheses
2.1 The Currency Board System in HK
Since October 1983, HK has adopted the CBS in which the money supply is fully backed
up by the US dollar held at the Exchange Fund of the Currency Board,3 and the HK
dollar is eﬀectively fixed at the oﬃcial rate of US$1 to HK$7.80. Because of the high
capital mobility and the fixed exchange-rate system, uncovered interest arbitrage will
ensure that HK’s interest rate will follow the US interest rate fairly closely during normal
periods. In other words, with the high capital mobility and the CBS, HK has no (or at
most very little) independence in the choice of her domestic interest rate. Thus, whether
there is overheating (such as the asset-bubble period between 1991 and mid 1997) or
recession (such as the post-crisis recession between late 1998 and 2002) in the domestic
economy, HK still has to adopt an interest-rate level similar to that in the US, even if
this level is out of line with the level desirable to HK.
3Under the system, any one of the three note-issuing banks wishing to print HK dollar notes need
to surrender an equivalent amount of US dollar (at the oﬃcial rate) to the Exchange Fund in exchange
for a Certificate of Indebtedness (CI), which entitles the note-issuing bank to print that amount of HK
dollar. On the other hand, the note-issuing banks can always use their holdings of CIs and HK dollar
notes to redeem an equivalent amount of US dollar from the Exchange Fund.
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As noted by Yip (1999), the outbreak of the AFC weakened the market’s confidence
in the continuation of the peg. This, together with a loophole in the CBS, implies a
substantial exchange-rate risk for the banks to conduct uncovered interest arbitrage. As
a result, banks refrained from performing arbitrage, despite the emergence of a huge
interest diﬀerential between the HK and US interest rates during the crisis period.
The above discussion suggests several hypotheses for further investigation. First, dur-
ing the non-crisis period, the absence of an independent interest-rate (monetary) policy
in HK results in (a) a small range that the HK-US interest diﬀerential can fluctuate, and
(b) a strong correlation between the changes in the HK and US interest rates. Second,
during the crisis period we may expect (a) the range of the HK-US interest diﬀerential
to widen (although this does not imply a greater independence in HK’s interest-rate
policy), and (b) a substantial decline in the correlation between the changes in the HK
and US interest rates.
Tse and Yip (2002) provided some empirical evidence related to the above hypothe-
ses. They found that the AFC did cause a surge in the level as well as the volatility of
the HK-US diﬀerential of the three-month interbank rates. There are, however, some
limitations in their empirical results. First, the average surge in the diﬀerential of the
interbank rate (1.28%) appears to be too small. Second, in their GARCH model they do
not allow for a possible diﬀerence in the dynamic response of the interest-rate diﬀerential
during the crisis and non-crisis periods. In this paper, we allow the dynamic response
(as determined by the AR coeﬃcients) to diﬀer in the crisis and non-crisis periods.4 As
we shall see in section 4, by allowing a diﬀerence in the AR coeﬃcients, we find evidence
of panic response in HK’s interbank market during the crisis. In addition, the estimated
surge in the interest-rate level during the crisis is larger than that reported by Tse and
Yip (2002).
A detailed account of the CBS reforms in HK was documented in Tse and Yip
4See section 3 for the details.
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(2002). The partition of the various subperiods of HK’s CBS reforms, together with
the definition of the AFC period, will be described in section 3. Hereby, we summarize
briefly the empirical findings of Tse and Yip (2002). These findings will be revisited
again in section 4 to compare against the new empirical results.
(a) The loophole in HK’s CBS allowed the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Cor-
poration (HSBC) to create money without a parallel increase in the US dollar holding as
the foreign exchange backup.5 This caused a fairly substantial downward bias in HK’s
three-month rate before the monetary reform introduced in 1 July 1988.
(b) The first monetary reform (Accounting Arrangements) introduced on 1 July 1998
removed the above loophole and hence the downward bias, leaving the HK three-month
rate a moderate risk/liquidity premium (of 32.7 basis points) relative to the US rate.
(c) The second reform (the introduction of the Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF)
on 1 June 1992) reduced the three-month rate premium (to 14 basis points).
(d) The misguided reform (revised mode of monetary operation) introduced on 16
March 1994 did not only remove the above premium but also led to a (slight) downward
bias (of 9.9 basis points).
(e) With the revitalization of interest arbitrage arising from the convertibility under-
taking measure in the anti-crisis package and the eventual fading out of the crisis, the
HK three-month rate was on par with the US rate during the post-crisis period.
2.2 The Monitoring Band System in SP
Unlike HK, SP has opted for an exchange-rate targeting system. The Monetary Author-
ity of Singapore (MAS) is equipped with a powerful set-up to target the exchange rate
level it desires. The power of the set-up comes from the liquidity drain through the Cen-
tral Provident Fund (CPF) and the persistent budget surplus. SP has adopted the CPF
5Before the first reform in July 1988, the HSBC was the only commercial bank in charge of the
interbank clearing system. As explained by Tse and Yip (2002), this special role endowed the HSBC
some freedom in creating money supply without a parallel increase in its US dollar holding.
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system in which employees and employers are required to contribute a total of 36-40%
of the employees’ basic salary into the fund.6 This, together with the persistent budget
surplus, has caused a severe liquidity drain from the economy to the government sector.7
To avoid economic transactions being constrained by the liquidity drain, the MAS would
re-inject liquidity back into the economy by purchasing US dollar (and selling SP dollar)
in the foreign exchange market. By doing so, the MAS achieves the dual objectives of
accumulating foreign reserves for the government and re-injecting liquidity back into the
economy. An important point of this arrangement is that, with the substantial size of
the liquidity drain, the MAS can achieve a wide range of appreciation and depreciation
by varying the amount of liquidity re-injection.
There are two main characteristics of SP’s exchange-rate policy since 1980. First,
there is some flexibility in the choice of the exchange-rate target, as reflected by the
following mix of strategies (see Yip and Wang (2001)):
(a) During the normal period, the MAS targeted an undisclosed but gradually appre-
ciating band of SP’s nominal eﬀective exchange rate (NEER) with a mean appreciation
of 2-3% per annum, which in turn reduced SP’s inflation in the long-run through lower
imported inflation.
(b) In case of a recession or a crisis, the MAS opted for a slower appreciation or
even allowed a major depreciation (by revising the mean and the width of the band) to
mitigate the adverse impact on SP’s economy.
Second, as noted by Rajan and Siregar (2002), the MAS in general (except for tactical
reasons) refrains from intervening so long as SP’s NEER lies within the (undisclosed and
adjustable) target band. In case there are clear evidence that a substantial depreciation
6Before the AFC, both employers and employees in SP were required to contribute 20% of the
employees’ basic salary to the CPF. During the AFC, the SP government reduced the employers’
contribution rate to 10% as part of the package to mitigate the adverse impact of the crisis. With the
economy recovering, the rate was revised to 12% and then 16%.
7There are withdrawals due to the house- and share-purchasing schemes (in which people can use
their CPF money to purchase houses and shares), retirement and other miscellaneous withdrawals.
Nevertheless, the net contribution remains substantially high.
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is necessary, the MAS revises the parity and/or widens the band so as to let the market
force determine the appropriate level and range of the exchange rate.
In the last two decades the SP dollar has been appreciating with only two episodes of
major depreciation. The first one was during the recession in 1985/86 and the second one
was during the AFC in 1997/98.8 Nevertheless, there were numerous occasions in which
the MAS opted for a higher or lower than average appreciation. For example, during the
overheated period of 1991-94 in which there were strong domestically generated inflation
arising from the building up of asset bubbles, the MAS opted for a higher than usual
appreciation rate of 4-5%. On the other hand, during the slowdown of the US economy
in 2001, the MAS opted for a neutral stance on the SP dollar.
Thus, the exchange-rate targeting in SP is less rigid than the exchange-rate peg in
HK. Even during the normal period, there was some flexibility in the choice of exchange-
rate in SP to cater for the domestic needs of the economy. This flexibility in turn
allows SP more independence in its interest-rate (monetary) policy. If the economy is
overheated, the MAS may opt for a greater appreciation of the SP dollar by re-injecting
less liquidity into the economy. The reduction in money supply will in turn bid up
the domestic interest rate and further help cool the overheated economy. On the other
hand, if the economy is slowing down, the MAS may opt for a lower, or even zero,
appreciation by re-injecting more liquidity back into the economy. This will in turn
bring down the domestic interest rate and further help stimulate the slowing economy.
As a result, we hypothesize that the greater flexibility in SP’s exchange-rate target
implies more independence in its interest-rate policy, which in turn implies (a) the range
of the SP-US interest diﬀerential should be bigger than the range of the HK-US interest
8As there was already downward pressure on the SP dollar during the recession and the crisis, the
SP government did not achieve depreciation through intervention. Instead, it simply widened the band
to allow the market force to push the SP dollar to lower levels. Nevertheless, it does not mean that the
SP government did not play an important role in this process. For example, at the beginning of the
AFC, the market was still hesitating whether the SP government would intervene. After deciding that
it would be better to let the SP dollar depreciate, the Finance Minister announced his intention to let
the market force determine the value of the SP dollar, giving the market the greenlight to push the SP
dollar further down.
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diﬀerential, and (b) the correlation between the changes in the SP and US interest rates
should be lower than that between HK and the US.
Having noted the implications of the first characteristic, we now come to the im-
plications of the second characteristic: the MAS usually refrains from intervention as
long as SP’s NEER lies within the target band. Compared with the case of a rigid peg,
this implies that SP has an extra variable (exchange rate) to absorb the impact of any
exogenous shocks. This would in turn mitigate the burden of the domestic interest rate
as an adjusting variable and hence reduce the volatility of SP’s interest rate. For exam-
ple, consider the case of an exogenous capital inflow (outflow). Without any change in
SP’s exchange rate, the exogenous capital inflow (outflow) will cause a decline (increase)
in the SP interest rate. However, with the SP dollar being allowed to fluctuate within
the band, the capital inflow (outflow) will cause an appreciation (depreciation) of the
SP dollar. This would in turn mitigate the capital flow and hence induce a smaller
rise (fall) in the SP interest rate. This case is particularly obvious during the AFC in
which the speculative pressure on the Asian currencies spilled over to SP and exerted an
upward pressure on the SP interest rate. By widening the target band and announcing
the intention to let the market force determine (i.e., depreciate) the value of the SP
dollar, the SP government allowed the SP dollar to fall to a lower level, which in turn
mitigated the upward pressure on SP’s interest rate. Thus, compared with the case of
a rigid peg/targeting, the second characteristic of allowing the SP dollar to fluctuate
within a band implies a lower volatility in the SP interest rate.
Before summarizing the hypotheses to be tested, we would like to highlight that
the hypothesis of a lower volatility of SP’s interest rate does not contradict with the
hypothesis of a larger range of interest rate that SP can choose. The former is due
to the existence of a band within which the SP dollar is free to fluctuate, while the
latter is related to the greater flexibility in revising the target of the SP dollar according
to the prevailing domestic economic conditions. As we shall see, the two seemingly
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alike measures are in fact captured by two diﬀerent sets of parameters in our empirical
model. In fact, we believe that the MAS has so far managed to strike an excellent
balance between the two characteristics.
2.3 Hypotheses to be tested
Summarizing the discussions in the above subsections, we arrive at the following testable
hypotheses:
(1) During the non-crisis period, the expected appreciation of the SP dollar implies
that the average SP-US interest diﬀerential should be at a discount.
(2) During the non-crisis period, the greater independence of interest-rate policy in
SP implies that (a) the range of the SP-US interest diﬀerential should be wider than the
range of the HK-US interest diﬀerential, and (b) the correlation between the changes in
the HK and the US interest rates should be higher than that between SP and the US.
(3) The monitoring band system in SP implies that there is an extra variable (ex-
change rate) to absorb the impact of exogenous shocks. This is, however, not the case
for HK’s CBS. Thus, we expect the volatility of the SP-US diﬀerential to be lower than
that of the HK-US diﬀerential during both the crisis and non-crisis periods.
(4) The crisis will lead to (a) a surge in both the HK-US and SP-US interest dif-
ferentials. This would also mean (b) a breakdown of the HK-US and SP-US interest
links (i.e., a substantial reduction in the correlation between the changes in the HK and
the US interest rates as well as the correlation between the changes in the SP and US
interest rates). As there was a substantial discount in the SP-US diﬀerential but no (or
limited) discount in the HK-US diﬀerential before the crisis, there will be (c) a substan-
tial premium in the HK-US diﬀerential during the crisis period. The SP-US diﬀerential,
however, could be positive, zero or negative.
(5) The changes highlighted in (4) will be reversed during the post-crisis period.
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3 The Data and the Methodology
Our data consist of daily observations of the HK, SP and US three-month interbank
rates. The data were obtained from the Datastream, and cover the period 1 April 1986
through 28 February 2002, with 4153 observations in total.9
Figure 1 plots the three-month interbank rates of the three economies, and figure 2
presents the three-month interest-rate diﬀerentials of HK-US and SP-US. Table 1 pro-
vides some summary statistics of the data, as well as the tests for unit root using the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The ADF statistics show that the hypothesis
that the SP and US interbank interest rates are nonstationary cannot be rejected at
the 10 percent level, while the hypothesis that the HK interbank interest rates are non-
stationary cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level.10 In contrast, the hypotheses that
the diﬀerenced interest rates are nonstationary are rejected at the 1 percent level for all
economies. Thus, the results indicate that all interbank interest rate series contain a unit
root. Next we check the stationarity of the HK-US and SP-US interest-rate diﬀerentials.
The ADF of the HK-US and SP-US interest-rate diﬀerentials are, respectively, −6.081
and −3.727. Thus, the evidence is in support of the interest-rate diﬀerentials being
stationary. Furthermore, in the system of three interest rates Johansen’s trace statistics
for the null hypotheses of at most one cointegrating equation and at most two cointe-
grating equations are, respectively, 17.137 and 0.037, providing additional evidence for
two cointegrating equations.
As documented in Tse and Yip (2002), the CBS in HK went through several reforms
in the last two decades. Also, the AFC was an external shock that had significant impact
on the economy. To capture the possible structural breaks in the data due to the CBS
reforms and the AFC we divide the sample period into seven subperiods, which are
9Although the CBS in HK came into eﬀect in October 1983, the data we collected from Datastream
were only available from 1986.
10The results of these tests are based on the critical values given by MacKinnon (1991).
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summarized as follows:11
Subperiods (No. of obs.) Events
P1: 86/4/1 — 88/6/30 (588) No monetary reform
P2: 88/7/1 — 92/5/31 (1021) Accounting Arrangements
P3: 92/6/1 — 94/3/15 (467) Liquidity Adjustment Facility
P4: 94/3/16 — 97/10/22 (941) Revised Mode of Operations, without AFC
P5: 97/10/23 — 98/9/04 (227) Revised Mode of Operations, with AFC
P6: 98/9/5 — 98/12/18 (75) Technical Measures, with AFC
P7: 98/12/19 — 02/2/28 (834) Technical Measures, without AFC
For the SP data, the only major external shock is the AFC. To capture the possible
structural break in the data we partition the sample period into three subperiods of crisis
and non-crisis as follows: (a) P1: 86/4/1 − 97/10/22 (pre-crisis), (b) P2: 97/10/23 −
98/10/9 (crisis), and (c) P3: 98/10/10 − 02/2/28 (post-crisis).12
As in Tse and Yip (2002), the interest-rate diﬀerentials of HK/SP versus US are
modelled using a model with time-varying conditional mean and conditional variance.
We denote the HK/SP three-month interbank rate at time t by rt and the three-month
US interbank rate by rUt.
13 Let yt = rt − rUt denote the interest-rate diﬀerential of
HK/SP versus US. As rt and rUt are found to be nonstationary while yt is found to
11See Tse and Yip (2002) for the detailed descriptions of the reforms, as well as for the justification for
the partition of the AFC. The AFC for HK is taken to begin on 97/10/23 and end on 98/12/18. While
the starting date of the AFC is fairly noncontroversal, choices of the ending data are open. First, a
possible (international) choice is 98/10/9 when the hedge funds, being forced to unwind their speculative
position due to banks’ credit tightening and redemption pressure arising from the Long Term Capital
Managment crisis, stopped financing their speculative leverage through Yen borrowings. Because of the
latter, the US$ fell sharply against the Yen within two days: from 130.7 Yen on 7 October to 111.8
Yen on 9 October. Second, a possible (domestic) choice is 98/12/18 when the Hong Kong Association
of Bank (HKAB) reduced its deposit rate, not because of any reduction in the US interest rate but
because the HKAB perceived the panics in HK were over. As Tse and Yip (2002) have adopted the
second choice and found the results to be satisfactory, we will follow this choice for the case of HK in
this paper. Note also that the AFC covers the subperiods P5 and P6, which are distinguished separately
due to the implementation of the Technical Measures during the AFC.
12As the ending date of the crisis in SP is more related to the international events instead of the
domestic events of HK, we have chosen 98/10/9 (the international choice in the previous footnote) as
the ending date of the crisis in SP.
13To economize the use of notations rt is used generically for both HK and SP interest rates. This
convention is preserved below.
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be stationary (see the discussions above), we model the dynamics of the interest-rate
diﬀerential yt using an autoregressive process.14 Furthermore, we allow the volatility
of the interest-rate diﬀerentials to be time-varying. In addition, dummy variables are
introduced in the conditional-mean and conditional-variance equations to capture the
eﬀects of the reforms (for HK) and the AFC (for both HK and SP). For example, for
the HK-US interest diﬀerential, we define Di, i = 1, ..., 7, as a dummy variable such that
Dit = 1 if t belongs to the subperiod Pi, and zero otherwise. Thus, the conditional-mean
equation for the interest-rate diﬀerential is given by
yt =
M[
i=1
δiDit +
p[
j=1
φjyt−j + εt (1)
so that yt follows an autoregressive (AR) process of order p. The time-varying intercept
δi determines the average interest-rate diﬀerential in each subperiod. For the HK-US
diﬀerential, M = 7; for the SP-US diﬀerential, M = 3.
In equation (1) the speed of adjustment of the interest-rate diﬀerential is determined
by the AR coeﬃcients φj. This model was used by Tse and Yip (2002) for the HK data,
with the assumption that the adjustment process is the same during and outside the
AFC. In this paper, we relax this restriction in the empirical model and allow φj to vary
in the crisis and non-crisis subperiods. This extension will be applied to the SP data as
well. Further details will be given in section 4.
We assume the conditional-variance of the residual εt follows a generalized autore-
gressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) process. The GARCH model was first
suggested by Bollerslev (1986) following the earlier work of Engle (1982), and has since
been applied extensively in the empirical finance literature.15 Thus, by assumption εt |
Φt−1 ∼ N(0,σ2t ), such that conditional on the information set Φt−1 at time t−1 the resid-
ual εt is distributed as a normal variable with mean zero and variance σ2t . In particular,
14For simplicity in estimation we use autoregressive process to model the stationary series yt.
15See, for example, Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992) for a survey.
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we assume a GARCH(1, 1) model such that
σ2t =
M[
i=1
γiDit + αε2t−1 + βσ2t−1.
In this equation the conditional-variance is allowed to shift according to the subpe-
riod. The parameter γi determines the shift in the volatility of the interest-rate diﬀer-
ential in subperiod Pi.
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We estimate the parameters of the conditional-mean and conditional-variance equa-
tions jointly using the quasi-MLE (QMLE) method (see Bollerslev and Wooldridge,
1992), and adopt a general-to-specific approach by testing the restrictions on the dummy
variables, which are tests of the impact of the reforms and the AFC as well as the equal-
ity of the AR coeﬃcients over diﬀerent subperiods. Restrictions on model parameters
are tested using the likelihood ratio (LR) statistic. LR is distributed approximately as
a χ2R when the restrictions are valid, where R denotes the number of restrictions on the
parameters.
To examine the comovements of the changes of the HK/SP interest rates versus the
US, we consider a bivariate model. The conditional-mean structures are again assumed
to follow autoregressive schemes. We denote the residuals of 7rt = rt − rt−1 and
7rUt = rUt− rU,t−1 by ξ1t and ξ2t, respectively, and let ξt = (ξ1t, ξ2t). The following AR
processes are assumed
7rt = δr +
pr[
j=1
φrj7rt−j + ξ1t,
7rUt = δU +
pU[
j=1
φUj7rU,t−j + ξ2t,
so that 7rt is an AR(pr) process and 7rUt is an AR(pU) process.17
16Note that we could allow the persistence of the volatility (as determined by α and β) to vary in the
crisis and non-crisis subperiods. However, we believe this extension is of second order. Furthermore,
the software used for computation does not allow for this extension.
17As we are not considering interest diﬀerentials, dummy variables are not incorporated into the
model. Thus, daily interest-rate changes are assumed to follow the same process regardless of CBS
reforms and/or AFC.
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For the conditional-variance process, we adopt a multivariate GARCH model in
which ξt |Φt−1 ∼ N(0,Ωt). The conditional-variance matrix is assumed to follow the
BEKK(1,1) structure given by18
Ωt =
#
c11 c12
0 c22
$ #
c11 c12
0 c22
$
+
#
g11 g12
g21 g22
$
Ωt−1
#
g11 g12
g21 g22
$
+
#
a11 a12
a21 a22
$
ξt−1ξ

t−1
#
a11 a12
a21 a22
$
. (2)
For the conditional-variance of 7rt (for HK or SP), dummy variables are added to allow
for shifts (increases) in the volatility during the AFC. These dummy variables are added
to the diagonal elements of the first term (the product of the triangular matrices) on the
right hand side of equation (2) above. The estimated equations are used to compute the
(daily) conditional correlations over the whole sample period, from which the average
correlations over the subperiods of pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis are calculated.
4 The Empirical Results
4.1 Univariate Models
The estimation results of the univariate GARCH models of the interest-rate diﬀerential
of HK-US and SP-US are summarized in tables 2 and 3, respectively. Model 1 in table
2 is a replication of the estimation results in Tse and Yip (2002), with the time span of
the data expanded. As explained in section 2, Model 1 does not allow for a diﬀerence
in the interest-rate response (i.e., the AR coeﬃcients) during the crisis and non-crisis
periods. In contrast, the AR coeﬃcients in Model 2 allow for diﬀerential response in
the following periods: (a) the non-crisis (NC) period prior to and after the AFC, (b)
the crisis period prior to the anti-crisis package (C1), and (c) the crisis period after
the anti-crisis package (C2). Using the penalized likelihood approach as given by the
Aikaike Information Criterion (AIC), Model 2 is preferred to Model 1 for the HK-US
18The BEKK model is named after Baba, Engle, Kraft and Kroner (see Engle and Kroner (1985)). It
has the advantage of ensuring the conditional-variance matrix to be theoretically positive semi-definite.
This model has been widely used in the financial econometrics literature.
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diﬀerentials.19 Similarly, in table 3 Model 2 allows the AR coeﬃcients to vary in the
crisis (C) and non-crisis (NC) subperiods.20 Based on the AIC, Model 2 is preferred to
Model 1.
By allowing the AR scheme to diﬀer during the crisis, we are in a position to inves-
tigate whether there is any evidence of panic response in the interbank markets. From
Model 2 in table 2, we note that φˆC11 = 1.17, providing evidence that there was a panic
response in the HK interbank market during subperiod P5 (i.e., the crisis period before
the anti-crisis package). The estimate implies that there was not only a tendency for the
impact of the shock to persist, but also a tendency for the diﬀerential to widen the next
day. However, the estimate φˆC12 = −0.24 suggests that the impact of the shock would
start to narrow down from the second day. With the imposition of the convertibility
undertaking measure within the anti-crisis package, φˆC21 is no longer greater than 1,
confirming our belief that the revitalisation of interest arbitrage has removed the panic
interest-rate response. As SP allowed substantial depreciation of its currency vis-a`-vis
the US dollar to absorb the shocks during the crisis period, the estimate φˆC1 = 0.86 in
table 3 confirms that there was no panic element in SP’s interest-rate response. It is
noted that the sum of φˆi (for both the HK and SP equations) during the crisis period
are less than that of the non-crisis period, reflecting the fact that the shocks during the
crisis are temporary in nature.
We now consider the estimated conditional-variance equations for the HK market.
A comparison of Model 1 and Model 2 suggests that the δˆi are very close to each other
during the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods (i.e., subperiods P1, P2, P3, P4 and P7).
Thus, Model 2 confirms the following empirical findings in Tse and Yip (2002):
(a) The loophole in HK’s CBS that allowed the HSBC to create money without a
parallel increase in the US dollar holding as the foreign exchange backup caused a fairly
19Specifically, we select the model to minimize −2 × log likelihood + 2 × number of parameters. The
likelihood ratio test is not used here as the two models are not nested.
20Unlike the case of HK, there is no further breakdown in the crisis period.
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substantial downward bias in HK’s three-month rate (of about 98.6 + 35.3 = 133.9 basis
points) in subperiod P1.
(b) The monetary reform (Accounting Arrangements) introduced at the beginning
of subperiod P2 removed the above loophole and hence the downward bias, leaving the
HK three-month rate a risk/liquidity premium of 35.3 basis points relative to the US
rate.
(c) The introduction of HK’s version of discount window (LAF) in the second mon-
etary reform reduced HK’s three-month rate premium to 15.5 basis points.
(d) The misguided reform (revised mode of monetary operation) introduced at the
beginning of subperiod P4 did not only remove the above premium but also led to a
downward bias of 14.2 basis points in subperiod P4. According to Tse and Yip (2002),
this misguided reform of injecting extra liquidity during substantial over-subscription of
IPOs fuelled the asset bubbles in this subperiod and represented temporary violations
of the monetary rule under the CBS. They also noted that, however, these violations
were temporary in nature.
(e) With the revitalization of interest arbitrage arising from the convertibility under-
taking measure in the anti-crisis package and the eventual fading out of the crisis, the
HK three-month rate was on par with the US rate during the post-crisis period.
Nevertheless, a comparison of δˆ5 in Model 1 and Model 2 confirms our belief that
the failure to take into account the possibility of diﬀerent interest-rate responses in the
crisis and non-crisis periods may have led to a downward bias in the estimated interest
diﬀerential between HK and the US in subperiod P5. The results in Model 2 show
that the estimated average interest diﬀerential is 2.01% and the average surge in the
diﬀerential is 2.15% (i.e., 2.01 + 0.14), larger than the corresponding estimates in Model
1 and in Tse and Yip (2002). In addition, the estimate δˆ6 suggested that there was a
similar downward bias in subperiod P6.
We now compare δˆi and the implied range of the SP and HK interest diﬀerentials
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during the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods.21 During the pre-crisis period, δˆ1 in Model
2 of table 3 shows that there was a 2.27% discount in the SP-US three-month interest
diﬀerential arising from the expected appreciation of the SP dollar vis-a`-vis the US
dollar. Meanwhile, the estimated standard error of δˆ1 shows that the implied four
standard-error range of the SP-US interest diﬀerential is 3.31%.22 Similarly, δˆ3 and its
estimated standard error suggests that: (a) during the post-crisis period, there was a
2.39% discount in SP’s three-month rate relative to the US rate, reflecting that the
market was expecting similar appreciation of the SP dollar vis-a`-vis the US dollar, and
(b) the implied four standard-error range of the SP-US interest diﬀerential is 4.88%. In
fact, a test for H0 : δ1 = δ3 gives a LR statistic of 0.0374, suggesting that there was
no change in the SP-US interest discount before and after the crisis. Similarly, the LR
statistic of H0 : γ1 = γ3 is 0.4828, suggesting that there was no change in SP’s interest
rate volatility between the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. Imposing these restrictions
gives an estimate of 2.32% interest discount and an implied four standard-error range of
3.29% for the non-crisis period. The latter implies that there is a relatively wide range
of interest rate that SP can choose during the non-crisis period. On the other hand,
due to the fixed exchange rate between the HK dollar and the US dollar, there was
no such interest discount in HK during the pre-crisis (i.e., subperiods P3 and P4) and
post-crisis (i.e., subperiod P7) periods. Besides, the implied four standard-error range of
the HK-US interest diﬀerential was only 0.24%, 0.21% and 0.23% for subperiods P3, P4
and P7, respectively. Such small ranges imply that the HK-US interest-rate diﬀerential
did not vary much during the non-crisis periods. Thus, we have found some supporting
evidence for the argument that: (a) the expected appreciation of the SP dollar vis-a`-vis
the US dollar led to a SP-US interest discount during the non-crisis period, and (b)
21The time span for the pre-crisis and the post-crisis periods in HK are diﬀerent from those of SP
(see footnote 12). We have chosen to report the results with the longest time span for each economy.
Nevertheless, the results with the same over-lapping time span for the two economies are qualitatively
the same.
22This is measured by 4 × standard error of δˆ1 ÷ (1− φˆNC1 − φˆNC3 ), which is approximately the 95%
interval of the interest-rate diﬀerential.
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when compared with HK, greater flexibility of exchange rate in SP allowed the economy
more independent choices in its interest-rate policies.
In addition to the results of more independent choices of interest-rate policies in SP,
it is also interesting to note that γˆi in Model 2 of tables 2 and 3 imply that the volatility
of SP’s interest rate relative to the US was lower than that of HK during the non-crisis
period. As shown in Model 2 of table 3, γˆ1 and γˆ3 imply that the unconditional standard
deviations of SP’s interest rate during the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods are 14.4 basis
points and 13.9 basis points, respectively. These are lower than the corresponding figures
of 24.9 basis points and 25.3 basis points in HK (i.e., in subperiods P4 and P7), confirming
our belief that the possibility of exchange-rate changes in SP during the normal period
helped absorb the impact of external shocks on SP’s interest rate.
The outbreak of the AFC caused an increase in SP’s interest rate. In fact, the crisis
virtually removed SP’s usual interest rate discount relative to the US, leaving δˆ2 in Model
2 of table 3 insignificantly diﬀerent from zero. Yet, the eﬀect of the crisis on SP was
much smaller when compared to HK’s 2.15% interest premium relative to the US (i.e.,
δˆ5 in Model 2 of table 2).23 One possible reason for the diﬀerence was that, during the
crisis period, SP allowed a depreciation of the SP dollar vis-a`-vis the US dollar so as to
absorb some of the shocks and alleviate some of the upward pressure on the SP interest
rate. On the other hand, the peg in HK ruled out the use of depreciation (vis-a`-vis the
US dollar) to absorb the shock. Besides, exchange-rate risk has discouraged arbitrage
activities from working to bring the HK interest rate down to the US level. As a result,
interest rate in HK has to bear the full burden of the shock. Thus, the flexibility of SP’s
exchange rate did not only cause a lower interest premium relative to the US but also
a lower volatility. According to Model 2 of tables 2 and 3, the implied unconditional
standard deviation of HK’s interest rate was 144.5 basis points, much higher than the
86.4 basis points in SP. With the higher interest rate premium and volatility in HK, it
23Chen and Chan (1997), Tsang (1999) and Yip (1999) argued that the high interest rate in HK was
the major source of HK’s economic pains during the crisis.
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is not surprising for HK to experience a more severe plunge in asset price and economic
pains during the crisis.
4.2 Bivariate Models
In section 2 we argue that the greater flexibility in the exchange-rate policy in SP
has permitted higher autonomy in its interest-rate policy. If SP did use exchange-rate
depreciation to absorb external shocks and fine-tune domestic booms and busts, we
should observe that, during the non-crisis period, (a) the range of the SP-US interest
diﬀerential should be wider than that of the HK-US diﬀerential, and (b) the correlation
between the interest-rate changes in SP and US should be smaller than that between
HK and the US. In the univariate estimation, we have seen evidence of the former. We
now consider the bivariate estimation to see whether there is evidence for the latter.
Table 4 reports the average correlation coeﬃcients between the changes in interest
rate of HK, SP and US during the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods.24 As we
can see, the SP-US correlation during the pre-crisis period (0.0684) was smaller than
the HK-US correlation (0.1764), thus further supporting our belief that the greater
flexibility of exchange rate allowed for a more independent choice of interest-rate policies
in SP. During the crisis, the HK-US correlation coeﬃcient plunged to a low level (—
0.0044), reflecting a break down in the HK-US interest link arising from speculative
attacks and the loophole in the CBS (failure of uncovered interest arbitrage amid the
confidence shock). Nevertheless, with the introduction of the convertibility undertaking
(anti-crisis package) and the eventual fading out of the crisis, the HK-US interest link
is re-established, as reflected in a rebound of the correlation back to the pre-crisis level
(0.1553).25 For SP, the lower correlation during the crisis (0.0090) reflected a breakdown
24As the crisis ended at diﬀerent dates in HK and SP, we define the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis
periods, respectively, as: (a) 92/06/01 — 97/10/22, 97/10/23 — 98/09/04, 98/12/19 — 02/02/28 for HK
versus US, (b) 86/04/01 — 97/10/22, 97/10/23 — 98/10/09, 98/10/10 — 02/02/28 for SP versus US, and
(c) 92/06/01 — 97/10/22, 97/10/23 — 98/09/04, 98/12/19 — 02/02/28 for HK versus SP.
25It is interesting to note that the HK-US correlation in the post-crisis period is slightly less than
that in the pre-crisis period. There are two possible reasons for this: (a) During the earlier part of the
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in the SP-US interest link during the crisis period. Nevertheless, the reduction of the
correlation in SP was smaller than that in HK, reflecting that the chaos created by the
crisis is much smaller in SP. With the fading out of the crisis, the SP-US correlation
bounced back to 0.0408.26 Despite the above diﬀerences between SP and HK, it is
interesting to note that the HK-SP correlation (0.1717) remained high during the crisis.
One reason is that both economies were subjected to the same contagion crisis among
the Asian economies. It is noted that the correlation (0.1938) went up further during
the post-crisis period.27
To further examine the relationship between the changes in the US versus the changes
in the HK interbank rates in various periods of the HK CBS reforms and AFC, we
calculate the average correlation coeﬃcient in each of the seven subperiods partitioned
according to the CBS reforms and AFC as described in section 3. The following results
are obtained: (a) the average correlation in sub-period P1 is relatively low (0.1261),
reflecting the fact that the HSBC’s special position (in creating money supply without
a parallel foreign exchange back-up) equipped the HSBC with a moderate autonomy in
choosing/fixing the interest rate; (b) the average correlation increased in subperiods P2
and P3 to 0.1848 and 0.1930, respectively. This suggests that the two reforms (namely,
the introduction of the Accounting Arrangements and the LAF) succeeded in bringing
the HK interest rate more in line with that of the US; (c) the average correlation fell
in subperiods P4 to 0.1681, reflecting the downward bias created by the revised mode
post-crisis period, there was a severe recession in HK, causing a substantial reduction in the demand
for loans in HK. To avoid drastic reduction in loan business, banks in HK were forced to accept lower
interest margins (many banks oﬀered new mortgage loans at rates below the prime rate). This might
have caused a lower HK-US correlation; (b) During the later part of the post-crisis period, there were
a series of interest-rate reductions in the US, bringing the US interest rate to fairly low level. HK’s
saving deposit rate would have reached negative level if the HKAB had followed the same amount of
rate cut in HK. This resistance of the HKAB to cut interest rates might have caused a lower HK-US
correlation.
26Similar to the case of HK-US, the SP-US correlation in the post-crisis period was less than that
in the pre-crisis period. This could be due to similar reasons cited for the case of HK, namely, the
resistance to follow US in interest-rate reduction.
27As noted in footnotes 25 and 26, both HK and SP resisted further reduction of interest rates during
the post-crisis period. This may explain why the HK-SP correlation in the post-crisis period was higher
than that in the pre-crisis period.
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of monetary operations; (d) after a substantial fall in the average correlation in the
crisis (subperiod P5) to —0.0044, the average correlation rose to 0.0156 in sub-period P6,
reflecting that the convertibility undertaking did manage to bring the HK interest rate
more in line with that of the US. Finally, with the fading out of the crisis (subperiod
P7), the average correlation (0.1516) rose back to the pre-crisis level .
5 Conclusions
Williamson (2000) has suggested that the debate on exchange-rate policy should be
currency boards versus crawling (monitoring) bands instead of fixed versus floating rates.
Along this line, a comparison of the HK and SP exchange rate systems is not only
crucial to the two economies, but also important for the debate on the optimal choice
of exchange-rate system. In this paper, we consider the potential advantages of one
exchange-rate system over the other. Focusing on the linkage between the exchange-
rate systems and the interest-rate behaviour in the two economies, we find that the
monitoring band system in SP has not only allowed a greater flexibility in the choice of
the exchange rate, but also a greater autonomy in the choice of interest rate to mitigate
the crisis, recession or overheating. In particular, we find empirical support for the
hypothesis that greater flexibility in the exchange rate target in SP was associated with
greater independence in its interest rate policy, as reflected by (a) a wider range of SP-US
interest diﬀerential, and (b) a lower correlation between the changes in the SP and US
interest rates. We have also found that MAS’s normal practice of avoiding unnecessary
intervention within the monitoring band was associated with a lower volatility in the
interest rate in SP during the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. On the other
hand, there was a higher HK-US interest premium during the crisis. The higher interest
premium in HK has been widely believed to be one of the major sources of economic
pains in HK.
In this paper we have made some improvement over Tse and Yip’s (2002) empirical
23
analysis. By allowing a diﬀerence in the interest-rate response between the crisis and the
non-crisis periods, we find that (a) there is a panic response in HK’s interbank market
but not in SP’s, and (b) the estimate of the average HK-US interest premium during the
crisis is higher than that reported in Tse and Yip (2002). We also find that the panic
response in HK’s interbank market has disappeared with the adoption of the anti-crisis
package. On the other hand, both the univariate and bivariate models support Tse and
Yip’s (2002) other empirical findings on the impacts of HK’s currency board reforms
since the late 1980s. In the bivariate model, we find a breakdown of the HK-US and SP-
US interest links during the crisis. After the crisis, the links were somewhat restored.
Meanwhile, the correlation between the changes in HK’s and SP’s interest rates rose
during the crisis period, reflecting the fact that both were aﬀected by the contagious
shocks at that time.
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Table 1: Summary statistics of three-month interbank rates
Statistic HK SP US
Mean 6.043 3.607 5.862
Median 5.875 3.310 5.750
Maximum 25.188 12.940 10.500
Minimum 0.625 0.625 1.641
Std Dev 2.183 1.571 1.750
Std Skewness 0.798 0.832 0.109
Std Kurtosis 5.369 3.865 2.820
ADF statistics
Interest rates —2.734 —2.192 —0.160
Diﬀerenced interest rates —32.122 —30.600 —70.412
Note: ADF statistic is the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic of test for
unit root.
Table 2: Estimation results of the HK-US three-month interest-rate diﬀerential
Model 1 Model 2
Implied Implied
Parameter Estimate s.e. mean/s.d. Parameter Estimate s.e. mean/s.d.
φ1 0.7427∗∗∗ 0.0185 φNC1 0.7208∗∗∗ 0.0187
φ2 0.0867∗∗∗ 0.0249 φNC2 0.0952∗∗∗ 0.0258
φ3 0.0579∗∗∗ 0.0217 φNC3 0.0777∗∗∗ 0.0224
φ4 0.0666∗∗∗ 0.0140 φNC4 0.0642∗∗∗ 0.0148
φC11 1.1734∗∗∗ 0.0660
φC12 —0.2376∗∗∗ 0.0678
φC21 0.9179∗∗∗ 0.0342
δ1 —0.0454∗∗∗ 0.0074 —0.983 δ1 —0.0415∗∗∗ 0.0076 —0.986
δ2 0.0164∗∗∗ 0.0043 0.354 δ2 0.0148∗∗∗ 0.0044 0.353
δ3 0.0070∗∗∗ 0.0025 0.152 δ3 0.0065∗∗∗ 0.0025 0.155
δ4 —0.0057∗∗ 0.0021 —0.124 δ4 —0.0060∗∗∗ 0.0022 —0.142
δ5 0.0385 0.0317 0.833 δ5 0.1292∗ 0.0680 2.011
δ6 0.0135 0.0175 0.293 δ6 0.0674 0.0614 1.049
δ7 0.0002 0.0025 0.004 δ7 0.0002 0.0025 0.002
γ1 0.0067∗∗∗ 0.0005 0.629 γ1 0.0066∗∗∗ 0.0005 0.549
γ2 0.0060∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.597 γ2 0.0060∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.524
γ3 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.296 γ3 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.261
γ4 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.285 γ4 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.249
γ5 0.0528∗∗∗ 0.0080 1.766 γ5 0.0454∗∗∗ 0.0085 1.445
γ6 0.0059∗∗∗ 0.0023 0.592 γ6 0.0064∗ 0.0037 0.544
γ7 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.290 γ7 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.253
α 0.4355∗∗∗ 0.0110 α 0.4228∗∗∗ 0.0115
β 0.5475∗∗∗ 0.0079 β 0.5555∗∗∗ 0.0083
Log-likelihood: 2342.1520 Log-likelihood: 2358.9059
Note: For Model 1, the mean interest-rate diﬀerential in sub-period Pi is calculated by δˆi/(1−S
j φˆj). For Model 2, it is calculated by δˆi/(1−
S
j φˆNCj ) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 7; δˆi/(1−
S
j φˆC1j ) for
i = 5; and δˆi/(1−
S
j φˆC2j ) for i = 6. For both models, the unconditional standard deviation of
the interest-rate diﬀerential in sub-period Pi is calculated by
t
γˆi/(1− αˆ− βˆ). The asterisks
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
1
Table 3: Estimation results of the SP-US three-month interest-rate diﬀerential
Model 1 Model 2
Implied Implied
Parameter Estimate s.e. mean/s.d. Parameter Estimate s.e. mean/s.d.
φ1 0.9121∗∗∗ 0.0187 φNC1 0.9048∗∗∗ 0.0194
φ3 0.0819∗∗∗ 0.0188 φNC3 0.0897∗∗∗ 0.0194
φC1 0.8561∗∗∗ 0.0374
δ1 —0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0045 —2.216 δ1 —0.0124∗∗∗ 0.0045 —2.265
δ2 —0.0009 0.0432 0.144 δ2 0.0261 0.0554 0.181
δ3 —0.0146∗∗ 0.0066 —2.437 δ3 —0.0131∗∗∗ 0.0067 —2.393
γ1 0.0031∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.143 γ1 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.144
γ2 0.1265∗∗∗ 0.0056 0.919 γ2 0.1094∗∗∗ 0.0092 0.864
γ3 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.138 γ3 0.0028∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.139
α 0.3681∗∗∗ 0.0196 α 0.3685∗∗∗ 0.0196
β 0.4820∗∗∗ 0.0173 β 0.4847∗∗∗ 0.0180
Log-likelihood: 1568.2682 Log-likelihood: 1581.3584
Note: For Model 1, the mean interest-rate diﬀerential in sub-period Pi is calculated by δˆi/(1−S
j φˆj). For Model 2, it is calculated by δˆi/(1−
S
j φˆNCj ) for i = 1 and 3; and δˆi/(1−
S
j φˆCj ) for
i = 2. For both models, the unconditional standard deviation of the interest-rate diﬀerential in
sub-period Pi is calculated by
t
γˆi/(1− αˆ− βˆ). The asterisks ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively.
1
Table 4: Average correlation in diﬀerent subperiods
Subperiod HK-US SP-US HK-SP
Pre-crisis 0.1764 0.0684 0.1562
Crisis −0.0044 0.0090 0.1717
Post-crisis 0.1553 0.0408 0.1938

